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Disagreements about the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of scientific theories are at 
least partly responsible for disagreements in other debates in the philosophy of science. I argue that 
available theories of theories and conceptual analyses of theory are ineffectual options for overcoming 
this difficulty. Directing my attention to debates about the properties of particular, named theories, I 
introduce ‘theory eliminativism’ as a certain type of debate-reformulation. As a methodological tool it 
has the potential to be a highly effective way to make real progress in the face of the noted problem. 
After the recommended reformulation questions of genuine importance to philosophy of science can 
still be asked and answered, but now without any possibility of disagreements about ‘theories’ 




1. Introduction. For several decades philosophers of science have spent much time and 
energy debating the concept scientific theory, asking questions such as ‘What is a scientific 
theory?’, ‘What is the structure of a scientific theory?’, ‘What is the relationship between 
scientific theories and models?’, and so on. The result is, on the face of it, a wide range of 
different conceptions, and very little agreement on the basics never mind the details. If this is 
right, then we have a bigger problem than is often appreciated: philosophy of science is 
defined by a family of debates, and most of these debates put considerable weight on the 
concept scientific theory.1
 It is this sort of thinking that brought Suppe (1977) to refer to our assumptions about the 
nature and structure of scientific theories as the ‘keystone’ of philosophy of science. He 
writes, 
 The result is a very real possibility that disagreements about 
theories are at least partly responsible for disagreements in these other debates. Thus the time 
and energy devoted to the concept scientific theory appears to be very much justified. 
 
If any problem in the philosophy of science justifiably can be claimed the most 
central or important, it is that of the nature and structure of scientific theories, 
including the diverse roles theories play in the scientific enterprise. For theories 
are the vehicle [sic] of scientific knowledge, and one way or another become 
involved in most aspects of the scientific enterprise. It is only a slight 
exaggeration to claim that a philosophy of science is little more than an analysis 
of theories and their roles in the scientific enterprise. A philosophy of science’s 
                                                            
1 Think of the pessimistic induction on past theories, the underdetermination of theories by evidence, 
theory confirmation, inter-theory relations, etc. 
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analysis of the nature of theories, including their roles in the growth of scientific 
knowledge, thus is its keystone; and should that analysis prove inadequate, that 
inadequacy is likely to extend to its account of the remaining aspects of the 
scientific enterprise and the knowledge it provides. At the very least, it calls for 
a reassessment of its entire account of scientific knowledge. (p.3)2
 
 
I believe that there is some truth in this (I will argue as much), but as stated the claim is 
vague, and Suppe does little to fill in the details. Doubtless many debates in the philosophy of 
science discuss scientific theories, whether particular, named theories or theories in general. 
But we must ask: (1) Are these debates really very sensitive to how we conceive of theories? 
And: (2) Is there much reason to suppose that our ‘analysis of the nature of theories’ is really 
so inadequate? 
 Suppose we can answer ‘yes’ to both of these questions. Even then, the problem of ‘the 
nature and structure of scientific theories’ needn’t be as crucial a problem as Suppe assumes. 
In what follows I wish to present an alternative approach to handling at least some debates 
within a certain class of debates in the philosophy of science which make heavy use of the 
concept scientific theory. In brief, the idea is that some debates can be usefully reformulated 
such that theories are no longer mentioned. In this way the questions that really matter in the 
debate can still be asked and answered (I will argue) but without any disagreements about 
‘theories’ affecting the debate. If this is possible then, contra Suppe, one can move forward in 
at least some relevant debates without having to spend one’s days deliberating over the nature 
and structure of scientific theories. 
 Of course, there are important details to add to this ‘pragmatic eliminativist’ proposal 
before it will be anything like viable. And there are several steps to take before it should even 
be considered. We need to answer questions (1) and (2), above, and we might ask whether 
one cannot simply draw on established literature on theories of theories (including Suppe’s 
own work), or carry out a conceptual analysis of scientific theory. And whatever difficulties 
one might find with these options, isn’t the ‘pragmatic eliminativism’ of theory going to be 
more trouble than it’s worth? Won’t the original disagreements show up again in the 
reformulated debate in some other form? If one eliminates theory-talk, doesn’t that just 
change the questions being asked? 
Each of these issues will be addressed in what follows. Given the complications, to focus 
this paper I will concentrate on a certain class of debates in the philosophy of science: those 
that discuss the properties of particular, named theories (so not debates about relations 
                                                            
2 Other philosophers have made similar claims; cf. Niiniluoto (1984, p.111): ‘The nature and function 
of scientific theories is perhaps the most central problem within the philosophy of science.’ 
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between such theories, or debates about theories in general, for example). For the sake of 
clarity I present at this stage a semi-formal synopsis of my main argument: 
 
P1: As things stand, there are many different views on the definition, nature, structure, 
ontology, and content of ‘theories’. 
P2: In at least some debates3
C1: [From P1 and P2] If we are going to continue 
, within a certain class of debates in the philosophy of science 
which discuss the properties of particular, named theories, disagreements about theories 
are at least partly responsible for disagreements in the debates. 
such debates
P3: Drawing on one or another available ‘theory of theories’ to support our conclusions will 
do little to help. 
 as currently framed, then we 
must accept that our conclusions are dependent on our view of ‘theories’, and thus are 
liable to be rejected by a large number of philosophers who hold different views about 
theories. 
P4: Drawing on one or another conceptual analysis of theory will do little to help. 
P5: Adopting a pluralist approach to theory-concepts (and particular theories) will do little to 
help. 
C2: [From C1 and P3-P5] If at all possible we ought not to continue such debates as currently 
framed (we want to avoid the consequent of C1).4
P6: It is actually possible to reformulate 
 
these debates
P7: The costs of the suggested eliminativism will usually be few: for example (i) the extra 
effort required to effect theory-eliminativism will be time well spent, and (ii) the 
questions that really matter in the debate will remain intact post-reformulation. 
 such that theory-talk does not feature at 
all, so that any disagreements about ‘theories’ cannot possibly affect the debate—this is 
the ‘pragmatic eliminativism’ of theory. 
C3: [From C2 and P6-P7] The methodology of ‘theory-eliminativism’ is likely to be 
worthwhile for at least some debates.   
 
The rest of this paper is devoted to working through this argument, defending the premises, 
and explaining just how the suggested ‘theory-eliminativism’ is supposed to work. 
 
                                                            
3 I use underline here and in what follows to emphasise where I am referring back to only certain 
debates within the class, where disagreements about theories affect the debate (as opposed to all 
debates in the class). 
4 There are (of course) suppressed premises here and elsewhere in the argument, but I am unaware of 
any suppressed premises that urgently require explicit defense. To reach C2, for example, I am 
assuming that we don’t want to let disagreements about what theories are affect other debates if we can 
help it (we want to resolve disagreements in these other debates, if possible). 
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2. Premise P1: different views on ‘theories’. This premise states that there are many 
different views on ‘theories’, including differences of opinion on the definition, nature, 
structure, ontology, and content of ‘theories’. I take this to be relatively uncontroversial, but it 
is worth emphasising the extent of the disagreement. If the differences in opinion were only 
slight, or only a small minority held ‘non-standard’ views, then we might be justified in 
assuming either (i) that differences of opinion about theories don’t affect our debates, or (ii) 
that we can consider the views of the small minority as probably misguided. But in fact there 
are major differences of opinion, and throughout philosophy of science. 
 Of course, the definition, nature, structure, ontology, and content of theories are not 
independent of each other, but they can nevertheless be taken in turn. To start with 
definitions, few serious attempts have been made at definitions of ‘theory’, beyond very 
general, vague, dictionary-style definitions. But such definitions are everywhere, and there are 
significant tensions between them even given their vagueness. One can find twenty different 
definitions of ‘scientific theory’ in five minutes using Google Books, searching for ‘ 
“definition of scientific theory” ’ and ‘ “a scientific theory is a” ’ (I leave this as an exercise 
for the reader). Many more are available in journal articles. Some authors note (and this 
seems right) that what one takes a scientific theory to be depends on one’s academic 
formation. This might suggest that we should be pluralists about the theory-concept, an option 
that will be investigated in §5, below. 
 I’ll take the nature, structure, and ontology of theories together. By this I will mean, 
respectively, the kind of thing theories are made up of, how these constituents fit together and 
relate to each other, and the sense in which they ‘exist’. So, for example, one option—
especially popular in the 1940s and 50s—is to treat theories as sets of statements and their 
deductive closure. Statements (and thus theories) might then be thought of (ontologically 
speaking) as linguistic, abstract, mental, existing in a ‘World 3’ (Popper), or otherwise. 
Despite strong objections to some of the details attached to this view in the 50s and 60s (eg. a 
logico-linguistic emphasis), certain variants of it are still popular (eg. Mahner et al. 1997, 
§9.3). More popular today is the so-called ‘semantic’ approach to theories, but it would be 
difficult to claim that there is a consensus. Numerous diverse views of theories have come 
under the label ‘semantic’ in the past thirty years or so (even if authors have sometimes 
rejected the label). It is sometimes said that on this view theories are ‘families of models’, but 
Ron Giere’s abstract, scientific models grouped by ‘family resemblance’ is a world away 
from the Suppesian view, where a set of model-theoretic models satisfy a set of axioms 
written in the language of set-theory (cf. Suppes 1967, da Costa and French 2003, Muller 
2009). Also within this semantic category one finds approaches such as that of the so-called 
‘German structuralists’ (Sneed, Stegmüller, Balzer, Moulines) with their ‘theory nets’, and the 
‘state-space’ or ‘phase-space’ approach (Suppe, van Fraassen). Then Nancy Cartwright has a 
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distinct but related view of theories, which has sometimes been labelled ‘semantic’, but which 
makes a distinction between the roles played by models and theories in science. And against 
both the syntactic and semantic views, Hendry and Psillos (2007) have argued that theories 
don’t consist of just one type of thing, but are instead ‘complex consortia of different 
representational media’ (p.160). 
 Even within these different approaches one can take different views on what might be 
called the ‘structure’ of theories. For example, some claim that theories have a ‘core’ or 
‘essence’ (eg. Gould 2002, Morrison 2007), that there are different ‘levels’ of theory (eg. 
Finkelstein 1966), that theories can be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ (cf. Bokulich 2006), that theories 
can be ‘established’ (Rohrlich and Hardin 1983), ‘categorical’ or ‘flexible’ (Finkelstein 
1966), ‘mechanistic’ (Craver 2002) or ‘modular’ (Darrigol 2008). And even this is the tip of 
the iceberg: there are also the views on theories provided by Kuhn’s ‘paradigms’ (1962), 
Lakatos’s ‘research programmes’ (1970), Toulmin’s ‘conceptual systems’ (1972) and 
Laudan’s ‘research traditions’ (1977). One can add to this Shapere’s analysis of theories in 
terms of ‘domains’ (1977), Darden and Maull’s ‘interfield theories’ (1977), Churchland on 
theories as ‘configurations of synaptic weights’ (1989), Batterman’s ‘theories between 
theories’ (1995), Wilson’s ‘theory façades’ approach (2006), and the recent ‘Hierarchical 
Bayesian Perspective’ (Henderson et al. 2010). 
 Finally there are disagreements about the content of particular, named theories. In other 
words, even if we agree that theories are made up of propositions (or models, or modules, or 
whatever), there is the questions of which propositions (models, modules) belong to a given, 
named theory. The above views constrain this, but they don’t determine it: even detailed 
definitions of ‘theory’ allow for different views on the content that should be ascribed to some 
particular theory. Disagreements on theory-content will be the main focus of this paper, and 
are best demonstrated by way of the examples in the next section.5
 
 
3. Premise P2: disagreements about ‘theories’ affect other debates. Some readers may 
think that, despite the range of opinions sketched in the previous section, such differences of 
opinion don’t seriously affect many debates in the philosophy of science. First, it should be 
made clear that I am not arguing here that this happens in many or most debates (although I 
am certainly not ruling this out); instead I am arguing that it happens at least often enough for 
it to be a concern that is worth addressing. Second, in this paper I am going to focus just on 
debates about the properties of particular, named theories. In this section I will present some 
                                                            
5 Much more could be said about (potential) disagreements about theories here. Where do we separate 
the theory’s ‘core’ from the ‘auxiliaries’? Where do we separate the theory from the background 
assumptions? Where do we separate the theory from its interpretation? And so on. 
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real cases where disagreements in the debate are at least partly (if not fully) caused by 
differing views on the content that should be ascribed to particular, named theories. 
 My first case is the recent debate as to whether ‘classical electrodynamics’ (CED) is 
inconsistent. Frisch (2005) argues that ‘the theory’ is inconsistent, but Muller (2007) and 
Belot (2007) disagree. Who is right? As Vickers (2008) points out, the disagreement hangs on 
the fact that what Frisch means by ‘classical electrodynamics’ is not what Muller and Belot 
mean by ‘classical electrodynamics’. Muller (2007) is representative of a rather extreme—but 
not uncommon—view in philosophy of science that it is possible to ‘define the theory’. He 
does this at the beginning of his paper as he sees fit, but unfortunately presents something 
different to Frisch’s focus of attention. In what follows there is understandable frustration as 
Muller strives to understand where Frisch is coming from, claiming that Frisch ‘has applied 
CED inconsistently’, that ‘the logic of the proof that has led him to this conclusion [is] 
flawed’, and that Frisch makes ‘two contradictory assumptions’ such that ‘we already have a 
contradiction by ∧ – introduction!’ 
 One response may be that all we have here is a terminological/referential 
misunderstanding. But reading Muller’s paper, there is a clear (if implicit) claim that Frisch’s 
conclusion is without value since what it is attached to is ‘not the theory’. Belot (2007) is a 
little more charitable: he sees that Frisch is using the term ‘classical electrodynamics’ to refer 
in a particular way, such that we do end up with an inconsistent set of assumptions. He then 
asks the question whether this is a sensible way to conceive of ‘the theory’, and concludes 
that it isn’t. In fact he goes as far as to say that Frisch’s conception of CED ‘does not deserve 
to be called a theory precisely because it is inconsistent.’ (p.277). However, Vickers (2008) 
shows that if one is initially tempted by Frisch’s conception of the theory, Belot’s objections 
carry little weight. 
 It should be no surprise that there are other examples where disagreements about the 
content that should be ascribed to a theory cause disagreements as to whether it is inconsistent 
or not. Whether we are discussing Aristotle’s theory of motion, the early calculus, Kirchhoff’s 
theory of diffraction, or Bohr’s theory of the atom, small changes in the content of these 
theories can make the difference between whether they are inconsistent or not. To take Bohr’s 
theory, Lakatos (1970), Brown (1992, 2002), Priest (2002), and da Costa and French (2003) 
claim that it is inconsistent, whereas Bartelborth (1989), Hendry (1993), and Hettema (1995) 
claim that it isn’t. Who is right? This time the main issue is which parts of CED we include as 
part of Bohr’s theory. Bartelborth (1989) argues that only ‘quasi-electrostatics’ should be 
admitted, whereas Brown (2002) suggests that the whole of CED must be included because 
there were applications of old quantum theory where CED was used. Do we then have an 
internally inconsistent theory, or two theories (Bohr’s theory and CED) which are mutually 
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inconsistent? And even if we put them together we don’t have an inconsistency if we interpret 
some of the ‘=’ symbols as ‘≈’ symbols, a move that Muller (2007) urges: 
 
[P]hysicists are notoriously sloppy in this respect: a majority of the exact 
equality signs (=) in most physics papers, articles, and books mean approximate 
equality (≈). (Muller 2007, p.261) 
 
As before, whether we should refer to ‘Bohr’s theory’ as inconsistent depends crucially on 
one’s views about how one should decide upon the content that belongs to the theory. 
 One may wonder at this stage whether this is a problem that can only arise in the context 
of debates about inconsistency in science, where small differences of opinion as to theory-
content can make all the difference between consistency/inconsistency. But in fact, (i) there 
are often large differences of opinion as to theory-content (as indicated in §2, above), and (ii) 
there are debates about other properties of theories which are sensitive to the content that gets 
ascribed to the theory. One obvious example outside inconsistency in science is the 
longstanding debate as to whether classical mechanics is deterministic. Several authors have 
urged that it is indeterministic (eg. Earman 1986, Hutchison 1993, Norton 2008), whereas 
others maintain that it is deterministic, such that one reaches the opposite conclusion only by 
misunderstanding ‘what the theory is’ (eg. Arnold 1977, Korolev 2007, 2010, Zinkernagel 
2010). And Wilson (2009) argues that the theory is neither deterministic nor indeterministic, 
because there are different ‘species’ of classical mechanics, some of which are deterministic 
and some of which are not. Again we have a clear case of disagreements about the content of 
the theory causing disagreements in the debate. 
 These cases are enough to show that this is a real phenomenon in the philosophy of 
science, but they are hardly the only cases. Since there are these clear disagreements about the 
content of particular theories, we can expect that there is the threat, at least, of similar 
problems arising in any debate about a particular, named theory. Consider predictions: does 
Bohr’s theory predict the intensities of the hydrogen spectral lines? Smith (1988) argues that 
it does because it includes the correspondence principle. But compare Shapere (1977): 
 
[T]he Bohr theory offered no way to account for the intensities and polarizations 
of the spectral lines… Use of the correspondence principle as a basis for 
calculating the polarizations of the lines is not considered here as a ‘part of the 
theory.’ (p.559) 
 
Whether the theory makes the prediction or not (and hence whether it might be 




4. Premises P3 and P4: theories of theories and conceptual analysis. How are we to 
determine who is right in the sorts of debate noted in the previous section? The obvious 
answer might be that we just need to get clear on who has the right view of what the content 
of the theory is. Or, better, that we need to decide who has the right view of whether the 
content at issue in the particular debate in question does/doesn’t belong to the theory. But 
how is this to be decided? Nickles (2002), focusing on debates about inconsistency in science, 
suggests that we need to sort out our theory of theories first: after all, if theories turn out to be 
families of models then it looks like they won’t even be the kind of thing which can be 
inconsistent (cf. pp.8-11). But this seems a rather hopeless strategy in the face of the mass of 
literature on theories indicated in §2, above. Instead of helping us to resolve debates about 
inconsistency in science, it asks us to shelve those debates until (optimistically!) we’ve 
resolved debates about theories of theories. In addition, even if we concluded that theories are 
(or should be represented as) sets of propositions, this does nothing to help us decide which 
propositions belong to a particular theory. 
 A more promising strategy might be to do conceptual analysis on theory. If one could 
establish, for example, that T is a theory iff T is a set of propositions put forward as serious 
candidates for the explanatory truth of a given domain of phenomena, and the deductive 
closure thereof, then this would give us at least some idea of which propositions do and don’t 
belong to a particular theory. Belot takes some steps in this direction, and apparently agrees 
with at least some features of the definition just given: as noted above, he states that Frisch’s 
conception of CED does not deserve to be called a ‘theory’ precisely because it is (known to 
be) inconsistent. This would be right if a theory was, by definition, something ‘put forward as 
a candidate for the explanatory truth’. However, the definition provided is controversial in a 
number of ways, and Frisch can find good reasons reject it. For one thing, it rules out any 
theory being (known to be) inconsistent, and yet there are several examples of scientific 
theories widely acknowledged to be inconsistent theories. And the focus on deductive closure 
would mean that any two inconsistent theories would actually be the very same theory, since 
they would both simply be the set of all propositions (by Ex contradictione quodlibet). Again, 
this goes strongly against received wisdom. 
 Questions such as ‘should “explanatory truth” play any part in our conception of a 
theory?’, and ‘should we include the deductive closure?’ are just small elements of a huge 
project here. As indicated in §2, above, there are about as many different definitions of 
‘scientific theory’ as there are philosophers. In other words, the problem with this strategy is 
very similar to the ‘theories of theories’ strategy: debates about the properties of theories are 
shelved, rather than resolved, until (optimistically!) we achieve an acceptable conceptual 
analysis of scientific theory. Complications multiply: First, which theory of concepts should 
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we employ? The so-called ‘classical’ theory of concepts, whereby we search for necessary 
and sufficient conditions, is now totally out of favour. In its place we find several other 
possibilities, including the neo-classical theory, prototype theory, the theory theory, the neo-
empiricist view, and conceptual atomism.6
 
 Then there is the question of the relationship 
between the concept theory, the concept of a particular theory (eg. classical electrodynamics), 
and the content that should be ascribed to a particular theory. So is conceptual analysis a good 
way to (help) resolve the sorts of debate discussed in §3, above? I submit that for at least 
some such debates there is a preferable strategy (to be presented in §6). 
5. Premise P5: pluralist responses. Different scientists and academics have different 
intuitions about what theories are. It has been noted, for example, that one is likely to have 
very different views on what theories are if one has more experience of (say) economics, 
biology, or theoretical physics. This may suggest that we should be pluralists about the 
theory-concept. This would also seem to resolve some of the tensions noted above. For 
example, one might say that Frisch has one theory-concept (focusing on the equations that are 
used by scientists) and Belot and Muller have another theory-concept (focusing on the 
equations that are/were believed by scientists). One might draw here on Kenat (1987, p. 87) 
and Suppe (1989, ch.14) who (drawing on a paper by Sylvain Bromberger) distinguish two 
types of theory: ‘Theories1’ are ‘theories as techniques for developing answers to problems’, 
and ‘theories2’ are ‘propositions’. We might then index these theory-concepts, and say that 
CED1 is inconsistent, and CED2 is consistent. 
 This may seem like a good solution on the surface, but the details tell a different story. 
Do we expect that we will find a manageably finite number of theory-concepts, analogous to 
the three major species-concepts that have been put forward (biospecies, phylospecies, and 
ecospecies)? Given the multitude of disagreement noted in §2, above, this seems optimistic. 
The overarching question is, how should we identify and index (some of) the different theory-
concepts? Obviously ‘theories as techniques for developing answers to problems’ and 
‘theories as propositions’ are hopelessly vague to be useful (descriptions of) theory-concepts. 
However, one may also ask how useful more specific theory-concepts are, such as ‘a theoryi 
is a set of propositions put forward as serious candidates for the explanatory truth of a given 
domain of phenomena, and the deductive closure thereof’. This will still lead us to very little 
determinate content for a given theory, since we will have to ask just how ‘serious’ the 
candidacy is, just what is meant in real terms by ‘put forward’, how we delineate the ‘given’ 
domain of phenomena, and so on. 
                                                            
6 These theories of concepts are introduced and discussed in any good handbook on concepts. A further 
complication, as Machery (2009) notes, is that ‘there are several prototype theories, several exemplar 
theories, and several theory theories’ (p.243). 
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 Even if we could identify and index theory-concepts, the big question for this paper is 
whether pluralism could help us resolve debates about the properties of particular theories. 
The main problem here appears to be that pluralism is going in the wrong direction: 
philosophers of science don’t first think of a theory-concept and then apply it to reveal a 
given theory’s content (to the extent that this is possible, given the vagueness necessarily 
inherent in any theory-concept). Instead, theory constituents are put together based on years 
of experience analysing and solving problems with the theory. So, for example, the content of 
CED provided by Frisch, Belot and Muller in the debate mentioned above does not seem to fit 
comfortably in any obvious theory-concept that might be invented. There are issues that are 
theory-specific, that a general theory-concept would never accommodate.  For example, 
Vickers (2008) shows why we might want to have different conceptions of CED depending 
on whether and in what way one wants the theory to accommodate the self-force effects of a 
charged particle and synchrotron phenomena. Similarly, the three ‘species of classical 
mechanics’ that Wilson (2009) distinguishes in the debate over the (in)determinacy of 
classical mechanics would not be identified by any general account of ‘theory kinds’, since 
they pertain to different ways of conceptualising the basic ontology of mechanics. The only 
theory concepts that could underwrite these three ‘species’ of the theory would be ones 
cooked up post-hoc, purely to accommodate this case. But under such circumstances the 
theory-concepts in question have failed to do what we wanted them to do: the idea was that 
delineating a plurality of theory-concepts could help us identify legitimate decisions on theory 
content, not the other way around.7
 Finally, one might argue that pluralism about theory-concepts in general is little help, but 
pluralism about particular theories is more help. The idea here would be that one can 
delineate different ‘contents’ for any given theory, without any overarching general theory of 
theory-content explaining these different ‘contents’ (since that would just bring us back to a 
general theory-concept pluralism). Instead one would have to justify why, in the context of a 
given debate, it was appropriate to focus on a given number of theoretical constituents. In fact 
this just brings us to the theory-eliminativism I wish to advocate in the next section: if one has 
told us the precise content one is considering, and explained why it is appropriate to consider 
it in the given context, calling that content ‘a formulation of the theory’ is to use this locution 
as a mere label for the specified content. Otherwise the particular-theory pluralist has closely 
related problems to the theory-concept pluralist: he or she is committed to a plurality of 
 
                                                            
7 There is also the question of why all the different theory-concepts get to be unified as theory-
concepts, as opposed to being just a number of concepts. The pluralist might hope to get around this by 
simply dropping the term ‘theory’, and just referring to ‘concepts’ used to analyze science. This in 
itself would be a type of eliminativism, but not a particularly helpful one. It would still leave the 
problems of how we identify and index the different concepts, and how useful they are in practice for 
resolving debates about (properties of) theories. 
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individuals, all of which deserve the title ‘formulation of the theory’ for some reason that 
requires articulation (drawing on conceptual analysis, and all the difficulties that gives rise 
to). 
 
6. Premise P6: theory eliminativism. So far I have argued that there are many different 
views on theories, and that these differences of opinion are at least partly responsible for 
disagreements in certain debates in the philosophy of science. I have further argued that 
available theories of theories, conceptual analysis, and theory-pluralism, are unsatisfactory 
ways of resolving this problem. On the face of it it looks like we have no other option, 
though, since the concept of a theory is so central to these debates. If we’re asking whether 
CED and Bohr’s theory of the atom are inconsistent, or whether classical mechanics is 
deterministic, or whether any given theory has some particular property, how can we manage 
without referring to the theory in question? 
 In this section I want to present as a methodological tool a certain type of debate-
reformulation which might be described as ‘theory-eliminativism’. Before I give a general 
characterisation, let me first demonstrate by showing how it would work for the debates over 
the (in)consistency of CED and the determinism of classical mechanics. As noted above, the 
main reaction to Frisch’s (2005) claim that ‘CED is inconsistent’ is that he simply gets the 
theory wrong. Muller (2007) ‘defines the theory’ to demonstrate this, and Belot (2007) gives 
several reasons why Frisch’s conception of the theory is not tolerable. But now consider how 
things would have developed if Frisch had claimed not that ‘CED is inconsistent’, but instead 
the following: 
 
Here are some assumptions relevant to electromagnetic phenomena which are 
mutually inconsistent [...]. They are inconsistent in the straightforward sense that 
one can deduce a contradiction from them as follows [...]. What is 
interesting/important about the fact that these particular assumptions are 
inconsistent is as follows [...]. 
 
Clearly if Frisch had put things this way, no disagreements about ‘what CED is’ could have 
arisen, since no reference to ‘CED’ is made. Even those with the view that there is a single, 
canonical form to CED could not object that Frisch had got the theory wrong. In fact, 
whatever views readers had on theories, however wild or diverse, those differences of opinion 
could no longer affect the assessment of Frisch’s claim. Instead the focus of attention would 
all be directed where it should be, in whatever analysis is given in the third and final set of 
square brackets in the above statement. 
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 The question arises whether this should really be described as a reformulation of the 
same debate, or whether a different debate altogether is being conducted post-reformulation. 
Obviously the debate has changed to some degree, and if the concept of a theory is really 
going to be eliminated some questions will disappear. The most obvious is ‘But is this really 
classical electrodynamics you’re talking about?’ I happen to think this is a bad question, 
based on a false premise, but there is no need for me to argue that here. The main point for 
this paper is that what is left out is a question about what the theory is, and not a question 
about inconsistency in science. What theory-eliminativism is designed to do is to enable one 
to move forward in one debate—for the purposes of this paper, a debate about a particular 
property (eg. inconsistency or determinism) of a given set of assumptions—without 
disagreements over ‘what the theory is’ getting in the way. Of course, the original 
disagreements about the concept scientific theory will remain, but the claim is that one can 
say everything it is important to say about the property in question without referring to ‘the 
theory’ (something I’ll argue in the next section). 
 The debate over the determinism of classical mechanics is another candidate for 
reformulation. Instead of claiming that ‘classical mechanics’ is/is not deterministic, one can 
instead eliminate ‘classical mechanics’ from the debate by reformulating one’s statements as 
follows: 
 
Here are some assumptions which imply that the mechanics of moving bodies is 
deterministic/indeterministic [...]. Let me demonstrate that they imply 
(in)determinism [...]. What is interesting and important about the fact that these 
particular assumptions imply (in)determinism is as follows [...]. 
 
Again, adding ‘and these assumptions actually constitute classical mechanics’ adds nothing to 
the importance of the claim being made: everything that is important about the claim is 
already stated explicitly in the final set of square brackets. Once again, in making this move 
one has managed to eliminate the concept of a theory from the debate, so that no 
disagreements about ‘what the theory is’ can possibly get in the way of the claim’s 
assessment. 
 Extension to the general case is straightforward. For any claim that might be made of the 
form ‘Theory T has property X’ one can say instead, 
 
Here are some theoretical constituents which have the property X [...]. This can 
be demonstrated as follows [...]. What is interesting and important about the fact 




In all cases this will preserve whatever it is that was important to say in the first place. Indeed, 
by forcing one to say explicitly what is interesting/important about the claim, it becomes 
impossible for one to hide behind the concept theory, as if it’s obvious that it’s an important 
claim simply because ‘the theory’ has that property. But the main point is that, in making 
such a reformulation, any disagreements about ‘what the theory is’ can no longer possibly 
affect the assessment of the claim being made. No appeal to a ‘theory of theories’ or a 
conceptual analysis of theory is necessary. And what is good about different ‘theories of 
theories’ is maintained in the process (I am certainly not dismissing the literature on ‘theories 
of theories’ as worthless). For example, if one wishes to discuss models, instead of 
propositions, one can: one simply presents the models, demonstrates that they have some 
feature, and then explains why that is interesting/important from the point of view of 
philosophy of science (eg. what it tells us about how science works). The most diverse 
‘theories of theories’ can be fully accommodated: Giere can put together a family of scientific 
models as his ‘theoretical constituents’, and Muller can put together a ‘set of structures in the 
domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate’ 
(Muller 2009). What is left behind is any claim that one is focusing on these things because 
‘that’s what a theory is’. Instead, the point of focusing on these things must be argued much 
more explicitly, by way of filling in that third and final set of square brackets. 
 Before I move on, three points of clarification may benefit certain readers. First, let me 
respond to the reader who would prefer the label ‘theory-quietism’ to ‘theory-eliminativism’. 
In the end it is the methodology that matters, not the name we choose for that methodology, 
but equally this doesn’t mean that any label will do. Unfortunately there are problems with 
both options, since what I am proposing is different in important ways from other ‘quietist’ 
and ‘eliminativist’ positions which have been put forward. For example, French (2008, 2010) 
proposes a ‘pragmatic quietism’ about the ontology of scientific models and theories, but this 
differs significantly from the position proposed here, for example because French makes no 
claim that we should stop making use of the concept of a ‘model’ or ‘theory’ in our debates, 
only that we should stop asking questions about their ontology. The main differences from 
other eliminativist positions are (i) that it is a pragmatic and not an ontological or scientific 
claim (so it’s not like claims for ‘species’-eliminativism, ‘innate’-eliminativism, ‘concept’-
eliminativism, etc.), and (ii) it is selective in the sense that it is only to be applied when there 
is a warrant for it. However, my sense is that the suggested methodology is close enough to 
other eliminativist proposals that ‘theory-eliminativism’ is a perfectly sensible term. 
Second, theory-eliminativism as I have described it does not necessarily rule out the use 
of terms such as ‘the theory’ and ‘formulation of the theory’—one might follow the suggested 
model and then simply add ‘and I call this set of constituents “(a formulation of) the theory”’. 
In that case the term in question is just being used as a label, and doesn’t carry any conceptual 
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weight. However, I don’t recommend this approach: it presents a danger because many 
readers will insist that that’s an improper use of the term, or may even fail to realize that the 
term is being used as a label only. In fact, in the debate over CED, Frisch (2005, p.26) tells us 
explicitly how he is using the term ‘theory’, but this didn’t stop Muller and Belot responding 
“That’s not the theory!” (give or take). The same problem arises for the particular-theory 
pluralism discussed in the previous section: it leaves room for the response “That’s not a 
formulation of the theory!” This sort of problem just disappears if one simply calls what 
we’re working with ‘formulations’ (say), and leaves theory-talk behind. 
 Third, I accept that in many cases the focus of debate may well be on the property in 
question, as opposed to on the identity of the theory. For example, there has been much 
dispute over precisely what we should mean by the ‘time-reversal-invariance’ of different 
theories. However, this doesn’t mean the methodology isn’t helpful: just because there is 
disagreement about the property doesn’t mean that disagreements about what the theory is 
aren’t also affecting the debate. 
 
7. Premise P7: two concerns. Some concerns may arise at this point that the costs of the 
suggested reformulation will be too much for it to be worthwhile. For example, won’t 
considerable effort be required to bring about the reformulation? Filling in the third set of 
square brackets in the examples given in the previous section will be hard work. However, 
this extra effort should not be regarded as a defect. Quite the contrary: the philosopher who 
wishes to make the statement ‘Theory T is X’ will be forced to think harder about just what is 
hidden within his or her conception of ‘the theory’ that makes the claim an interesting or 
important claim. In the process, it will either be stated much more clearly why it is an 
important result, or one may find that the claim isn’t as interesting/important as originally 
supposed, and reconsider making it in the first place. For example, compare Frisch (2008) 
reflecting on his original claim that ‘CED is inconsistent’: ‘I am inclined to agree with my 
critics that this inconsistency in itself is less telling than my previous discussions may have 
suggested.’ (p.94). In short, the extra work required by reformulation is likely to be time well 
spent, not simply time spent saying in a convoluted way what one could have said much more 
succinctly in terms of ‘the theory’. 
 More serious, perhaps, is the concern that something important is lost from the debate 
during reformulation. After all, one is being denied a concept—whether it be theory or some 
specific-theory-concept such as classical electrodynamics—which is ubiquitous in both the 
relevant science and the philosophy of science. Can one really describe science adequately if 
one takes away a term that the scientists themselves regularly make use of? 
 In this paper I cannot pretend to argue that in any possible debate nothing will be lost, 
but I can indicate how this might be the case by arguing that nothing important is lost in 
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reformulating the concrete examples discussed above. First, is anything lost from the Frisch 
debate if we reformulate things so that no reference is made to ‘the theory’ or ‘CED’? To 
reformulate, Frisch first needs to state precisely which assumptions he is considering, which 
he does, more or less (Frisch 2005, p.33). He then needs to demonstrate that a contradiction 
follows, which he also does (p.34). But the question then is why this is an interesting or 
important result: do we learn anything about how science works, for example? There are two 
obvious ways in which an inconsistency in science might be interesting, both of which can be 
articulated and debated without making reference to ‘the theory’, as we will now see. 
First, it might be that all of the inconsistent assumptions were genuinely believed by 
scientists (or at least believed to be candidates for the truth). This would only really happen if 
scientists were unaware that the assumptions are inconsistent, in which case it might then be 
interesting to analyse why, precisely, the inconsistency wasn’t noticed, and consider whether 
there are similar blind-spots in other corners of science. However, in fact, it is clear that the 
assumptions Frisch presents were not considered ‘candidates for the truth’, so Frisch’s 
inconsistency could never be interesting in this sense (as Frisch himself would admit, cf. 
Frisch 2005, p.35). 
 The second obvious way in which an inconsistency can be interesting/important is when 
all of the assumptions in question were used by scientists, even if they weren’t considered 
‘candidates for the truth’. This is actually quite a common occurrence: it is well known that 
idealization and approximation techniques are ubiquitous in science, especially in physics. 
Especially interesting here is when the relevant de-idealizations are not possible (perhaps 
because the mathematics is intractable): in such circumstances one is sometimes forced to 
work with an inconsistent set of assumptions. In such a case the question arises how one can 
judge which derivations are trustworthy. Since one is working with assumptions which are 
necessarily false, even if one makes use of truth-preserving inferences one often has no way 
of knowing whether a given inference has taken one from close-to-truth to far-from-truth. 
 It may look like Frisch’s assumptions match this latter case. Certainly his assumption 
about the Lorentz force equation is naturally described as an idealization assumption, and it 
turns out severe problems accompany any attempt at de-idealization (cf. Frisch 2008, p.95). 
So one might defend Frisch by explaining his claim as one where the inconsistency of the 
assumptions in question is interesting because it is a case of scientists routinely reasoning 
with inconsistent assumptions. One might then examine this reasoning further, assessing how 
scientists went about judging which inferences were trustworthy, and whether there are 
lessons for how scientists should reason in the face of inconsistencies in current science (eg. 
the conflict between general relativity and quantum theory).  
Vickers (2008) argues that we don’t quite have this situation, since there isn’t a clear 
sense in which Frisch’s version of the Lorentz force equation was used by scientists to make 
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inferences. But this is not the point of current concern. The worry was that, in making the 
reformulation, something important is lost from the original debate. But the discussion just 
given shows how whatever it is that may be important about Frisch’s original claim does not 
require mention of ‘classical electrodynamics’ or ‘the theory’ for articulation and discussion. 
 Taking now the debate as to whether ‘classical mechanics’ is deterministic, the question 
might be raised whether in eliminating reference to ‘classical mechanics’ and ‘the theory’ we 
lose something important from the original debate. Well, what is important about the original 
debate? Perhaps the most obvious answer is that, if it can be shown that classical mechanics is 
indeterministic, then one might be well placed to argue that individuals in the history of 
science were implicitly committed to something they would have wanted to reject. This 
would be interesting since it raises the questions of why they didn’t notice, how it would have 
changed things if they had noticed, and what we can learn from this about things we might be 
blind to in current science. 
 If this is indeed the point of the debate, then it can continue at least as successfully 
without talk of ‘classical mechanics’ or ‘the theory’. A rough overview of how it could 
continue is as follows. First (i) one can identify the assumptions pertinent to the point you are 
trying to make—eg. Newton’s three laws of motion. Second (ii) one can show that, given 
these assumptions, the mechanics of bodies is indeterministic in certain contexts. Then (iii) 
one has to make the case that this is interesting/important. For example, one might carry out 
some historical work to argue that relevant characters from the history of science (1) accepted 
these assumptions, (2) weren’t aware of the indeterminism, and (3) would have found the 
indeterminism intolerable, had they been aware of it. 
 Opposition to this story can then also proceed without reference to ‘classical mechanics’ 
or ‘the theory’. One may argue that the indeterministic ‘contexts’ in question are either 
‘unphysical’ or make use of ‘inadmissible idealizations’ (cf. Norton 2008, Korolev 2010). 
One might argue that relevant scientists made other assumptions, in addition to Newton’s 
laws, which do then assure determinism in the given contexts (cf. Korolev 2007). Or one 
might argue against the claim that Newton’s laws by themselves entail indeterminism, either 
claiming that Newton’s laws in fact do assure determinism when properly understood (cf. 
Zinkernagel 2010), or by arguing that Newton’s laws by themselves entail neither 
determinism nor indeterminism (cf. Wilson 2009). In this way everything we might want to 
say can be said. Adding claims such as ‘classical mechanics actually consists of more than 
just Newton’s laws’ or ‘determinism is an axiom of classical mechanics’ add nothing of 
value, and only cause the sorts of damaging disagreement and miscommunication noted 
above. 
Wilson (2009) at first seems to take a more sensible approach, distinguishing three 
different ways in which the term ‘classical mechanics’ might appropriately be employed. But 
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in fact he also has a view on what we should mean by ‘classical mechanics’ that is 
unnecessary to the debate and can only cause trouble. In his view, classical mechanics does 
not merely consist of Newton’s laws, nor consist of Newton’s laws plus something else which 
can be explicitly given, but consists of Newton’s laws plus ‘descriptive gaps’, into which 
different assumptions can be plugged depending on the context (Wilson 2009, eg. pp.9-10). 
For example, he distinguishes three different ‘species’ of the theory, each of which fills these 
‘gaps’ in a different way. But this conception of ‘the theory’ just isn’t necessary to make the 
main point he wants to make. What he really wants to establish is that people who use 
Newton’s laws to solve problems in mechanics also make use of certain other assumptions, 
depending on the context, and depending on which assumptions are added to Newton’s laws 
we may or may not reach determinism/indeterminism. 
An objection that might arise for both of these examples is as follows. If we can’t refer to 
‘the theory’, then we can’t ask questions such as ‘Were the assumptions Frisch identifies what 
scientists working at the time meant to refer to when they used the term ‘CED’?’ and ‘How 
did scientists at the time use the term ‘classical mechanics’ to refer—did they mean it to refer 
to something more than just Newton’s three laws?’ But this is really no objection at all: it is 
really a question about the use of a term, not a question about theories as things that ‘exist’ in 
the history of science. Theory-eliminativism as I have delineated it is compatible with 
discussing how any particular term is used: the discussion of the use of a term (eg. ‘theory’) 
should be distinguished from a discussion which invokes theories as things, with properties, 
etc. At any rate, usually it will not be important to consider theorists’ beliefs about how 
certain terms like ‘classical mechanics’ referred. What will be most important will be to 
consider the assumptions (models, etc) they believed, accepted, used, etc.—especially the 
ones that were unified together for particular purposes (eg. prediction, explanation, etc.). 
 
8. Conclusion. This completes my defence of the premises of the semi-formal argument 
presented in §1. The conclusion of the argument—that the sort of theory-eliminativism 
described is likely to be worthwhile for at least some debates—is modest in many respects. 
No claim is made that it will be worthwhile for all debates. Indeed, in this paper I have 
focused solely on debates about the properties particular theories have, and not on other types 
of debate (eg. about relations between particular theories, or about theories in general). And 
the claim isn’t even that theory-eliminativism will benefit all debates in the particular class of 
debates I have focused on. However, that isn’t to say that nothing of significance has been 
achieved: I have outlined here a methodological tool for the philosopher of science which 
enables one to carry out debates without any disagreements, miscommunication, or plain 
confusion about ‘scientific theories’ affecting those debates, and such that little or nothing is 
sacrificed in the process. Further, I have shown that there are concrete cases in the literature 
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which can benefit from this methodology. It remains possible that the methodology can 
benefit many debates in the philosophy of science, including debates about relations between 
particular theories (eg. the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics), and theories 
in general (eg. the realism debate). So, although a modest proposal for the purposes of this 





Arnold, V. I. (1977): Mathematical Methods of Classical Mechanics. Berlin: Springer. 
Bartelborth, T. (1989): ‘Kann es Rational Sein, eine Inkonsistente Theorie zu Akzeptieren?’, 
Philosophia Naturalis, 26, pp. 91-120. 
Batterman, R. (1995): ‘Theories Between Theories: Asymptotic Limiting Intertheoretic 
Relations’, Synthese, 103, pp. 171-201. 
Belot, G. (2007): ‘Is Classical Electrodynamics an Inconsistent Theory?’, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 37, pp. 263-82 
Bokulich, A. (2006): ‘Heisenberg Meets Kuhn: Closed Theories and Paradigms’, Philosophy of 
Science, 73, pp.90-107. 
Brown, B. (1992): ‘Old Quantum Theory: A Paraconsistent Approach’, PSA 1992, Vol.2, pp.397-
411. 
_______ (2002): ‘Approximate Truth: A Paraconsistent Account’, in J. Meheus (ed.), 
Inconsistency in Science, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp.81-103. 
Churchland, P. (1989): A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure 
of Science. MIT Press. 
Craver, C. (2002): ‘Structures of Scientific Theories’, in Machamer, P. and Silberstein, M (eds.), 
The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002, 
pp.55-79. 
Da Costa, N.C.A. and French, S. (2003): Science and Partial Truth. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Darden, L. and Maull, N. (1977): ‘Interfield Theories’, Philosophy of Science, 44, no.1, pp.43-64. 
Darrigol, O. (2008): ‘The Modular Structure of Physical Theories’, Synthese, 162, pp.195-223. 
Earman, J. (1986): A Primer on Determinism. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Finkelstein, D. (1966): ‘Matter, Space and Logic’, in C. A. Hooker (ed.), The Logico-algebraic 
Approach to Quantum Mechanics II. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 




French, S. (2008): ‘The Structure of Theories’, in Psillos, S. and Curd, M. (eds.), The Routledge 
Companion to the Philosophy of Science. London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2008, 
pp.269-280. 
_______ (2010): ‘Keeping Quiet on the Ontology of Models’, Synthese, 172, no.2, pp.231-249. 
Frisch, M. (2005): Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gould, S. J. (2002): The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. London: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Henderson, L., Goodman, N. D., Tenenbaum, J. B., Woodward, J. E. (2010): ‘The Structure and 
Dynamics of Scientific Theories: A Hierarchical Bayesian Perspective’, Philosophy of 
Science, 77, pp.172-200. 
Hendry, R. (1993): Realism, History and the Quantum Theory: Philosophical and Historical 
Arguments for Realism as a Methodological Thesis. PhD thesis: LSE. 
Hendry, R. and Psillos, S. (2007): ‘How to Do Things with Theories: An Interactive View of 
Language and Models in Science’, in J. Brzeziński, A. Klawiter, T. A. F. Kuipers, K. 
Łastowski, K. Paprzycka, P. Przybysz (eds.), The Courage of Doing Philosophy: 
Essays Dedicated to Leszek Nowak, pp.59-115. Amsterdam/New York, NY: Rodopi, 
2007. 
Hettema, H. (1995): ‘Bohr’s Theory of the Atom 1913-1923: A Case Study in the Progress of 
Scientific Research Programmes’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern 
Physics, 26, pp.307-323. 
Hutchison, K. (1993): ‘Is Classical Mechanics Really Time-Reversible and Deterministic?’, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, no.2, pp.307-323. 
Kenat, R. (1987): Physical Interpretation: Eddington, Idealization and Stellar Structure Theory. 
PhD thesis, University of Maryland. 
Korolev, A. (2007): ‘Indeterminism, Asymptotic Reasoning, and Time Irreversibility in Classical 
Physics’, Philosophy of Science, 74, pp.943-956. 
_______ (2010): ‘The Norton-Type Lipschitz-Indeterministic Systems and Elastic Phenomena: 
Indeterminism as an Artefact of Infinite Idealizations’, forthcoming in Philosophy of 
Science (PSA 2008 contributed papers). 
Kuhn, T. (1962): The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lakatos, I. (1970): ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs’, in I. 
Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 91-195. 
Laudan, L. (1977): Progress and its Problems. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Machery, E. (2009): Doing Without Concepts. Oxford: OUP. 
Mahner, M. And Bunge, M. (1997): Foundations of Biophilosophy. Berlin; New York: Springer. 




Muller, F. A. (2007): ‘Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics?’, Philosophy of Science, 74, 
pp. 253-77. 
_______ (2009): ‘Reflections on the Revolution at Stanford’, Synthese 170. 
Nickles, T. (2002): ‘From Copernicus to Ptolemy: Inconsistency and Method’, in J. Meheus (ed.), 
2002, pp.1-33. 
Niiniluoto, I. (1984): Is Science Progressive? Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel. 
Norton, J. (2008): ‘The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of Determinism’, Philosophy of 
Science 75, pp.786-798. 
Priest, G. (2002): ‘Inconsistency and the Empirical Sciences’, in J. Meheus (ed.), Inconsistency in 
Science, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp.119-128. 
Rohrlich, F. and Hardin, L. (1983): ‘Established Theories’, Philosophy of Science, 50, pp. 603-17. 
Shapere, D. (1977): ‘Scientific Theories and Their Domains’, in F. Suppe (ed.), The Structure of 
Scientific Theories, Illinois, University of Illinois Press, pp.518-565. 
Smith, J. (1988): ‘Inconsistency and Scientific Reasoning’, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, 19, pp.429-445. 
Suppe, F. (ed.)(1977): The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd edition. Illinois: University of 
Illinois Press. 
________ (1989): The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Illinois: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Suppes, P. (1967): ‘What is a scientific theory?’, in S. Morgenbesser (ed.), Philosophy of Science 
Today. New York: Basic Books Inc., pp.55-67. 
Toulmin, S. (1972): Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Vickers, P. (2008): ‘Frisch, Muller and Belot on an Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics’, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59, no.4, pp.1-26. 
Wilson, M. (2006): Wandering Significance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_______ (2009): ‘Determinism and the Mystery of the Missing Physics’, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 60, pp.173-193. 
Zinkernagel, H. (2010): ‘Causal Fundamentalism in Physics’, in M. Suárez, M. Dorato, and M. 
Rédei (eds.) EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences, Dordrecht: Springer, pp.311-
322. 
